CDA STATEMENT: The Biden-Harris administration’s Cuba policy; an explainer and recommendations

September 15, 2021

WASHINGTON- Today, the Center for Democracy in the Americas (CDA) releases a comprehensive memorandum which discusses and recommends detailed policy actions the Biden-Harris Administration could take to best support the Cuban people as they face a dire humanitarian crisis during the pandemic. The memo also provides a timeline of the Administration's actions on Cuba from day one to present. CDA Executive Director Jorge Quintana released the following statement:

"The President has pledged to stand by the Cuban people. Unfortunately, too often, our own sanctions stand in the way of the Administration's stated policy goals. CDA’s recommended actions are concrete actions the Administration could, and should, take today that would give substance to the President's pledge to stand by the Cuban people. These actions in the areas of humanitarian aid, remittances, consular services and the embassy, travel and exchange, and internet usage in Cuba are all readily available to the Administration."

The President tasked his Remittance working group with providing recommendations to the President. That work has been completed and the recommendations have been submitted. 

“The time for study is concluded. Now, the President has to act and couple action for the Cuban people with his words of support,” Quintana added.

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Memorandum

Subject: The Biden-Harris administration’s Cuba policy; an explainer and recommendations

Date: September 15, 2021 

Questions? Contact info@democracyinamericas.org

 

Summary

While on the campaign trail, Vice President Joe Biden made promises to countermand restrictions imposed by the Trump administration on travel and remittances to Cuba, reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, re-engage with Cuba, and “promptly reverse the failed Trump policies that have inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights.” 

Since taking office, the Biden-Harris administration has failed to act upon campaign promises, initially maintaining that Cuba policy was not a priority. (See below for a timeline of actions taken by the Administration.) The demonstrations taking place throughout the island on July 11 instilled a sense of urgency in the Administration’s Cuba policy review, and the Administration has stated that Cuba is now a priority. However, this change in rhetoric has failed to lead to substantial change and a complete reversal of Trump-era policies appears unlikely in the near future. As the Cuban population faces a genuine humanitarian crisis, the Biden-Harris administration can and should prioritize the immediate humanitarian needs of the Cuban people. The Administration should uphold their campaign promises, empower the Cuban people to determine their own fate, and remove U.S. obstacles impeding stated U.S. policy goals. 

Policy Recommendations

The continuing U.S. policy of hostility and isolation is not improving democracy or human rights on the island, nor providing support for the Cuban people; rather, it is politicizing a humanitarian crisis and distracting from dynamic and actionable solutions. The suggestions below can help alleviate the current situation in Cuba and should be acted upon with urgency.

Humanitarian aid: 

The Administration should remove tedious reporting requirements and bureaucratic processes to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid. In particular, the Biden-Harris administration should:

  • Remove the specific licenses required to send medical supplies to Cuba such as testing kits and respiratory devices to Cuba and end or suspend end-use verification, thereby decreasing the often deterrent red tape in sending aid to Cuba from the U.S. and empowering donors and sellers to act; 

  • Lift restrictions on the percentage of U.S.-made material used in foreign produced medical supplies and lift all restrictions on banking and financial transactions related to humanitarian aid, thereby removing fear of encountering repercussions and increasing the flow of aid from U.S. entities, churches, NGOs, and international individuals and companies;    

  • Offer short-term general licenses for those categories of sales or donations, thereby mobilizing aid efforts and making humanitarian licensing a clearer, quicker, more accessible, and more navigable process for those interested in providing relief to the Cuban people.

Background and Impact: The current humanitarian situation in Cuba continues to grow more dire with  increasing COVID-19 cases and deaths, decreasing resources and medical supplies, police violence and repression in response to the July 11 protests, and continued food and goods shortages. While the embargo allows for the shipment of humanitarian aid, in practice, licensing requirements, end-use verification, restrictions on the banking sector, and fear of unknowingly running afoul of U.S. law, among other barriers, complicate sending aid to Cuba. 

There is both precedent for humanitarian support from U.S. Presidents and desire on the part of the American people to act. However, other than encouraging U.S. citizens to utilize humanitarian and medical exceptions in U.S. sanctions, which are fraught with bureaucratic obstacles, the Administration has done little to facilitate relief for the Cuban people. After Hurricane Ike in 2008, President George W. Bush offered bilateral humanitarian aid to Cuba, however, during the greatest humanitarian crisis Cuba has faced, appropriate humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people from the Biden-Harris administration remains to be seen. During the pandemic, the Biden-Harris administration issued general licenses related to Iran, Venezuela, and Syria allowing more coronavirus-related transactions and activities. By contrast, the licenses offered to U.S. charter flight companies in August to fly aid to Cuba in September were much more restrictive in scope and did not lessen restrictions and sanctions on financial transactions or banking institutions. There is no reason that providing medical supplies to Cuba, which has been facing one of highest infection rates in the world, should require specific licenses.

Remittances: 

The Biden-Harris administration should restore remittance channels, thereby allowing Cuban Americans to exercise their right to send, or not send, remittances to Cuba. In particular, the Administration should:

  • Remove the restrictions on sending donative remittances, thereby allowing private entities and NGOs in the United States to provide humanitarian assistance and start-up capital for Cuban entrepreneurs, especially for those traditionally with less family members abroad, such as Afro-Cubans;

  • Lift restrictions on family remittances, thereby allowing Cuban Americans to assist their families during the pandemic, support small and medium sized enterprises with much needed start-up capital from abroad, and improve the standard of living of Cuban families; 

  • Remove the $1000 quarterly limit on remittances;

  • Reverse the prohibition on “U-turn” banking transactions, which are transactions that originate and terminate outside of the U.S. but use a U.S. banking institution to process the transaction, usually due to the transaction calling for payment in U.S. dollars. This would allow Cuban entrepreneurs to engage in foreign markets and with foreign entities. 

  • Revisit the list of Cuban companies currently prohibited from processing financial transactions, such as remittances processed by Western Union, which was practically the only provider of remittance payments for transactions from the U.S. to Cuba;

  • Loosen regulations on banking and online payment processing, thereby allowing Cuban Americans, private businesses, and NGOs to further limit the amount of remittances extracted by the government by facilitating the flow of money directly into the hands of Cubans.

Background and Impact: In the wake of the July 11 protests, the Biden-Harris administration announced the creation of a Remittance Working Group tasked with expediting a review within 30 days of how to send remittances directly to the Cuban people, bypassing Cuba’s government. The deadline has since passed and the working group’s findings remain to be seen. 56 percent of Cuban families received remittances from family members abroad prior to the tightening of sanctions by the previous Administration. Those families deserve the ability to exercise their right to send, or not send, remittances. 

Despite the Administration’s concerns over Cuba’s government obtaining revenue from remittances, Cuba's government no longer captures the amount of revenue from remittances as it has in the past. Since July 2020, Cuba no longer taxes dollar remittances or requires Cubans to convert dollars to local currency. Much of the government’s revenue from remittances captured from hard currency store sales is channeled to food, fuel, and goods imports. 

There is also precedent for re-establishing remittance flows to countries facing massive crises. Just this month (September 2021), the Biden-Harris administration restarted the flow of remittances through Western Union to Afghanistan. As such, the Administration is keenly aware of the importance that remittance channels have for Afghan residents. Cuban Americans should have the same ability to assist their families in Cuba.

Consular services and embassy staffing:

The Biden-Harris administration should fully restaff the U.S. Embassy in Havana with the necessary measures to ensure the safety of U.S. personnel, and resume consular services in Cuba. Specifically, the Administration should:

  • Restore the staff, status, and capacity of the U.S. Embassy in Havana to be fully operational;

  • Resume the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program (CFRP), without which, approximately 22,000 families have been cruelly and needlessly kept separated for years;

  • Uphold the U.S.’s 1994/1995 migration accords commitment to issue 20,000 visas annually to Cuban nationals, thereby upholding a longstanding migration agreement, providing a safe and regulated migration pathway for Cubans, and supporting U.S. national security interests; 

  • Reverse the reduction of the B2 visa validity for Cuban nationals from a three-month single entry visa to a five-year multiple entries visa, thereby facilitating family travel, cultural and academic exchange, and business travel for Cubans;  

  • Reopen the Refugee Section that administers the U.S. Refugees Admission Program in Cuba.

Background and Impact: When the Trump administration closed consular services at the U.S. Embassy in Havana in 2017, the parameters under which Cubans could travel or migrate to the U.S. greatly changed. Without the formal mechanisms, Cubans seeking to legally emigrate to the United States, or to visit relatives in the United States, were forced to make a logistically complicated and expensive journey to third countries to apply for visas. In addition to the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program (CFRP) cases that have been held up with a scaled back U.S. Embassy in Havana, more than 78,000 other immigrant visas from Cuba have been backlogged, bringing the total to more than 100,000 pending cases and putting the U.S. in violation of its 1994/1995 migration accords with Cuba. Cuba continues to uphold its responsibilities under the migration accord.

As it stands, the suspension of consular services and the severely reduced capacity of the embassy are counterproductive to the stated goals of the Administration, specifically pertaining to national security interests, irregular migration trends, and allowing Cuban Americans to connect with relatives. A fully functional embassy can support U.S. national security interests by taking steps to shrink irregular migration by sea or otherwise. Irregular migration by sea has increased from 49 Cuban migrants interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard in fiscal year 2020 to over 700 Cuban migrants thus far in the current fiscal year. Irregular migration from Cuba also places pressure and strain on U.S. immigration personnel and resources at the U.S.-Mexico border. Allowing for the regular processing in Cuba would alleviate these pressures.

In addition to U.S. national security interests and managing irregular migration, restaffing the U.S. Embassy in Havana essential to supporting U.S. interests pertaining to human rights and empowering the Cuban people. A fully functioning embassy is important to help monitor human rights and other developments on the ground, as well as initiate a human rights dialogue with Cuba’s government and advocate against arbitrary detentions, which has been a central policy point of all U.S. administrations, including the Biden-Harris administration. At full capacity, the U.S. Embassy in Havana could also engage with and provide critical support to Cuban civil society on the island on a regular basis and in a transparent manner, thereby playing an actively supportive role in allowing the necessary conditions for Cubans to determine their own future, while ensuring that Cuba’s civil society has the tools and resources to play their critical role in the future of their country.

Travel and exchange: 

The Administration should remove restrictions on private and commercial travel, while attending to the necessary health and safety precautions amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, the Biden-Harris administration should:

  • Allow non-family travel by reinstating the authorization for group people-to-people educational travel and amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to make passenger and recreational vessels (cruises) and private and corporate aircraft eligible for a license exception once again;

  • Remove restrictions to which airports U.S. flights can travel to, thereby allowing Cuban Americans to visit and support their family across the island;

  • Resume public charter air travel to all locations in Cuba and remove the cap on the number of public charter flights to Havana, thereby expanding the economic benefits of tourism for everyday Cubans, particularly Cubans outside of Havana, and the Cuban private sector;

  • Remove sanctions against companies leasing aircraft to Cuban government entities, thereby allowing several international flights into Cuba to resume;

Background and Impact: Americans and Cuban Americans are the U.S.’s best ambassadors for our values in Cuba, yet restrictions on travel have virtually eliminated exchanges between Cuban Americans, Americans, and Cubans, hinder family connections, and limit Cuba’s once burgeoning private sector. Restrictions to group and individual people-to-people travel and academic exchange hinder cultural exchange and collaboration amongst the people of the U.S. and Cuba, thereby preventing an incredibly robust and dynamic form of diplomacy to take place. Such restrictions to travel and exchange also obstructs the constitutional right of U.S. citizens to travel internationally.

Restrictions on travel also make it more difficult for Cuban Americans to visit and reunite with family on the island. This is especially true for Cuban Americans with families outside of Havana. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Cuban Americans hoping to bring humanitarian relief to the island have faced limited and costly flights. Allowing travel to Cuba would increase the flow of necessary humanitarian supplies to Cuba and increase the amount and distribution of money and goods sent directly into the hands of Cubans, which is particularly important during a time of immense economic and humanitarian crisis.

Internet, technology, and communications:

The Biden-Harris administration should support increased access to free and effective internet in Cuba, and help facilitate the free flow of information across Cuba and between the U.S. and Cuba. In particular, the following actions should be taken by the Administration and Congress:

  • Re-examine the 2019 Cuba Internet Task Force recommendations, including facilitating the export of telecommunications equipment and infrastructure, promoting technological literacy and digital safety education, promoting exchange programs, and empowering local, organic, network growth. Though the telecommunications environment has changed, many of the challenges and opportunities remain the same;

  • Remove sanctions, as is within its purview, to allow U.S.-based firms to provide cloud-based services such as online payment processing to Cuba, which could help get donative and family remittances directly to the Cuban people. Likewise, it should allow subscription-based platforms in Cuba; 

  • Reintroduce and pass the Cuban DATA Act in Congress, which called for the authorization of the exportation and provision of telecommunication devices and services to Cuba as well as the ability to enter into contracts regarding the provision of telecommunication services with any individual or entity in Cuba.

Background and Impact: Increased channels of communication and access to information via the internet and social media platforms in recent years have dramatically influenced how Cubans communicate. Cuba legalized personal cell phone and text messaging services in 2008 and by 2014, there were approximately 3 million cell phone users on the island. Today, more than half of the island’s population has a cell phone and 2.5 million Cubans have 3G or 4G access. This increase in access is in part due to reforms facilitated by the Obama-Biden administration beginning in 2015, such as a partnership with Google that brought increased Wifi and broadband access to the island. Such expansion has allowed Cubans to more quickly and easily share images and videos with those off the island, which became particularly important during and in the wake of the July 11 protests in Cuba.

Past Administrations have undertaken perhaps well-meaning but ill-conceived efforts to expand internet access in Cuba. Such efforts were widely seen as politically-driven efforts to undermine Cuba's government, rather than as efforts to increase unfettered communication among Cubans. It is critical that Cuban citizens themselves have both access to and autonomy over their internet. Efforts to weaponize the internet, to use it for the spread of disinformation, or to censor it by any government should not be tolerated

Secure internet access serves a critical role in allowing Cubans access to the free flow of information. The Administration has expressed interest in exploring ways to support free and effective internet access in Cuba. As it stands, the calls for expanded access to the internet are hindered by the Administration’s own policies and the legacy of a failed Cuba policy. Without the removal of U.S. sanctions, the U.S. will serve as an impediment to their own policy goals and Cubans will remain facing restricted access to countless services, platforms, technologies, websites, and information. These include online payment processing and subscription based platforms such Zoom, CiscoWebex, Adobe systems, Texas Instruments (TI), Dell, Snapchat, PayPal, Venmo, eBay, Stripe, Digi-Key Electronics, NetBeans, Oracle Corporation, and nearly 20 different Google sites, among many others. Sanctions restrict most U.S. technology companies from making available cloud services that Cuban individuals and private companies could use to develop and support the internet experiences we take for granted in the United States. It is U.S. regulations that prevent the Cuban people from the promise of the internet to further assist their development of both private business and civil society.

Timeline of the Biden-Harris administration’s Cuba policy 

January 2021 

Public Statements: Since the Biden-Harris administration took office, it has articulated that its policy would be governed by two principles: (1) support for democracy and human rights and (2) that Americans, especially Cuban Americans, are the best ambassadors for prosperity in Cuba. The Administration also expressed that it would take its own path following a policy review. 

February 2021 

Public Statements: Senior White House official Juan González spoke of intentions to lift remittance and travel restrictions, and to review the restaffing of the U.S. Embassy in Havana, while also criticizing the Trump administration’s policy choices for being disproportionately punitive to Cubans and Cuban Americans and highly ineffective in obtaining policy objectives pertaining to democracy and human rights. The White House repeatedly reiterated its two core principles of Cuba policy and that it was reviewing its policy towards Cuba.

March 2021

Public Statements: White House Press Secretary, Jen Psaki, stated that “A Cuba policy shift is not currently among President Biden’s top priorities.” The Administration repeated that Cuba policy is under review and that it would consult Cuban Americans and members of Congress. 

April 2021 

Actions: Cubans remained on the Emergency Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for FY2021, meaning that all Cubans may be considered refugees for the purpose of admission into the United States. This designation is given to only six other groups of people or nations. 

Public Statements: When questioned about Raúl Castro stepping down as head of the communist party, thereby signaling the end of Castro leadership in Cuba, State Department Press Secretary Ned Price reiterated that a Cuba policy shift is not a top priority, repeated its two core principles, and stated that Cuba policy is under review. 

May 2021 

Actions: The Biden-Harris administration sustained Trump-era Cuba policy by maintaining Cuba on the list of countries certified as not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Additionally, the U.S. Department of State released a report on religious freedom in Cuba, criticizing the government for suppressing religious groups on the island. 

Public Statements: On May 20, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken released a message to the Cuban people stating, “The United States recommits to accompanying the Cuban people in your quest to determine your own future.”

June 2021

Actions: The House Appropriations Committee approved the State Department’s proposal of a decreased budget for Radio and TV Martí programming while restating that the Administration is reviewing Cuba policy and is doing so in conversation with various stakeholders. 

On June 23, the U.S. voted against a resolution condemning the U.S. embargo on Cuba at the 75th session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, signaling their support for the embargo. Each year since 1992, the UN has voted on a resolution to condemn the U.S. embargo on Cuba and, at all but one meeting, the U.S. has voted against the resolution. In 2016, the Obama-Biden administration historically abstained from voting on the resolution for the first time. Following the abstention, the Trump administration reverted back to voting in support of the U.S. embargo on Cuba. 

Public Statements: Juan González restated interest in removing restrictions on sending remittances to the island and reestablishing U.S. consular services in Cuba, and noted a deterioration of human rights on the island. On June 30, Secretary Blinken answered questions about Cuba policy and again reiterated that the Administration was reviewing Cuba policy under the guidance of their two core principles. 

July 2021 

Actions: The State Department released the 2021 Trafficking In Persons Report and designated Cuba as one of the 15 countries with a Tier 3 ranking. Countries with Tier 3 rankings are subject to financial penalties, may be subject to restrictions of foreign assistance, and may also face possible U.S. opposition to similar assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The report also listed Cuba’s government as one of 11 governments committing state-sponsored human trafficking. In the report’s launch ceremony, Secretary Blinken specifically noted Cuba’s international medical missions. 

Following the demonstrations that started on July 11 (J11) across the island, senior White House officials met with Cuban American leaders on July 19 to speak about policy recommendations and later shared that the Biden-Harris administration was monitoring the situation in Cuba closely and that Cuba was now a “top priority for the Administration.” The Biden-Harris administration also ordered the State Department to review the restaffing of the U.S. Embassy in Havana and announced the creation of a Remittance Working Group to evaluate how Cuban Americans can send remittances to their family members in Cuba without Cuba’s government capturing significant revenue. The same day, the Administration called on Cuba’s leaders to reinstate access to the internet, while also continuing to seek out external alternative means to restore internet access to the island. It was also stated that the U.S. would focus on sanctioning government officials in Cuba who were “responsible for the brutal crackdown” on July 11.

On July 22, the Biden-Harris administration announced sanctions “targeting elements of the Cuban regime responsible for this crackdown… to hold them accountable for their actions.” Specifically, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) instated sanctions on Cuba’s Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), Álvaro López Miera, and the Ministry of the Interior’s (MINIT) Special National Brigade, or “Boinas Negras” (Black Berets).

On July 30, President Biden hosted a second meeting with different leaders in the Cuban American community. At the meeting, President Biden reaffirmed the Administration’s efforts to provide internet access to Cubans, stated that the Remittance Working Group would provide their recommended remittance policy on how to maximize the flow of remittances to the Cuban people within one month, and shared continued efforts pertaining to restaffing the U.S. Embassy in Havana. Also on July 30, OFAC announced additional sanctions on Cuba’s Revolutionary National Police, as well as individual sanctions against the chief, Oscar Callejas Valcarce, and deputy chief, Eddy Sierra Arias, of the National Police. 

Public Statements: Following the J11 protests, the Biden-Harris administration released multiple statements in support of the Cuban people and their right to protest. The day after the protests, President Biden released a statement urging Cuba’s government to listen to and support its people. He also called the protests a “clarion call for freedom.” Later in the week, President Biden spoke about how the U.S. would respond to the protests, sharing that the U.S. would look into technology that would restore internet access in Cuba and how the U.S. could send vaccines to Cuba. President Biden also stated that Cuba was a “failed state” that is “repressing” its citizens and that the U.S. would not be reinstating remittances to Cuba. Later in the week, the White House changed course and shared that they would review reinstating remittances.

On July 13, U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas announced that Cuban migrants traveling across the Florida Straits would be repatriated by the U.S. Coast Guard. The Biden-Harris administration urged Cubans against traveling to the U.S., stating “if you take to the sea, you will not come to the United States.” Migratory travel across the Florida Straits by Cubans migrants has seen an immense increase in recent months. So far in FY2021, which began on October 1, 2020, the Coast Guard has interdicted over 700 Cuban migrants, compared to 49 Cuban migrants in FY2020 and 313 interdictions in FY2019.

Following the second round of sanctions announced on July 22 (see above), the Administration stated that they would be engaging with international partners, collaborating with the private sector to increase connectivity and internet access in Cuba, meeting with Cuban American leaders, reviewing the remittances policy, and working to restaff the U.S. Embassy in Havana. On July 23, the State Department released a fact sheet regarding sending humanitarian aid to Cuba, which listed the U.S. law and regulations surrounding exporting to Cuba, and encouraged U.S. citizens to send support to the Cuban people using the “exemptions and authorizations relating to exports of food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods to Cuba.”

On July 25, the Biden-Harris administration released a joint statement with 20 countries condemning the response of Cuba’s government to the J11 protests and calling on Cuba’s government to respect the freedom and rights of the Cuban people.

August 2021 

Actions: On August 11, one month after the J11 protests, OFAC and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) reiterated their support of internet freedom in Cuba and released a fact sheet on relevant sanctioning. The fact sheet lays out exemptions to the U.S. embargo on Cuba that allow certain telecommunications services to be provided to Cuba. The fact sheet’s press release reiterates the U.S.’s condemnation of Cuba’s government’s efforts to “silence protests” on July 11 as well as its support for human rights, freedom of expression, the right of peaceful assembly, and the right to free access to the internet and information for the Cuban people.

On August 13, the U.S. State Department announced a third round of sanctions issued by OFAC in response to the J11 protests. The additional sanctions were imposed on Romárico Vidal Sotomayor García, chief of the Political Directorate of MININT, Pedro Orlando Martinez Fernandez, chief of the Political Directorate of the National Police, and on the Tropas de Prevención, also known as “Boinas Rojas” or Red Berets, of MINFAR.

On August 17, the Biden-Harris administration authorized emergency flights containing humanitarian aid to travel to Cuba. The authorization allowed for two Miami-based airlines to complete up to 20 trips each to deliver humanitarian aid and diplomatic cargo across the island until the end of September 2021. The flights are not able to carry passengers.

On August 19, OFAC announced a fourth round of sanctions since the July 11 protests on three top Cuban officials. The additional sanctions were imposed on Andrés Laureano González Brito, Chief of the Central Army under MINFAR, Roberto Legrá Sotolongo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Directorate of Operations under MINFAR, and Abelardo Jimenez Gonzalez, Chief of the Directorate of Penitentiary Establishments of MININT.

Public Statements: On August 11, the U.S. State Department stated that Cuba was a “top priority” for the Biden-Harris administration, urged the release of detained demonstrators, and reaffirmed a continued commitment to “providing support to the Cuban people, whether it is facilitating humanitarian assistance or information access.”

In conjunction with the fourth round of sanctioning on August 19, the U.S. Department of State reiterated support of sanctioning additional senior Cuban officials in a press release and through comments by the U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken. Secretary Blinken pledged to hold Cuban officials accountable for violence and human rights violations around the J11 protests, as did Secretary Mayorkas after meeting with Cuban Americans at a church in Miami to discuss the aftermath of the J11 protests.

September 2021

Actions: On September 3, the U.S. Department of State announced that it would begin restaffing the U.S. Embassy in Havana. A State Department spokesperson stated that the gradual restaffing is intended to “enhance our ability to engage with civil society and, at the appropriate time, to increase consular services to Cubans, while ensuring the safety of U.S. diplomats serving in Cuba.”

For a more detailed timeline, visit here.

CONTACT:

CDA Press Office (202) 234-5506

press@democracyinamericas.org

This document is available as a PDF here.

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